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Abstract
We analyse how progressive taxation and education subsidies aﬀect schooling deci-
sions when the returns to education are stochastic. We use the theory of real options
to solve the problem of education choice in a dynamic stochastic model. We show that
education attainment will be an increasing function of the risk associated with educa-
tion. Furthermore, this result holds regardless of the degree of risk aversion. We also
show that progressive taxes will tend to increase education attainment.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper examines the eﬀect of public policy on individual education choices in a theoret-
ical framework that allows both for intertemporal optimisation and uncertainty. In doing
so we build upon a large literature that views education choice as an investment in human
capital, to be thought of in much the same way as we think of investment in physical or
ﬁnancial capital (see Card, 2001, for a comprehensive survey). Nevertheless, the concept of
risk — routinely included in theoretical and empirical discussions of other investment — is
often absent from discussions of individual schooling choice.
This is a curious omission as the risk associated with education choices will likely be
an important determinant of how individuals arrive at those choices. Dominitz and Manski
(1996) show that individuals believe that education carries substantial risk. Carneiro et al.
(2003a) show that only 9% of the variance of returns to a college education are forecastable
by individuals at the time of making college choices and that over one third of college
graduates experience negative returns to their college education.
Our approach to modelling risk in education is to view education choice as an option
problem.1 We think of an individual in school as possessing an option to leave at any
time and take up work at a wage related (stochastically) to the time spent in school. This
approach is a close approximation to reality — at least for formal schooling and initial college
education. Most individuals stay in education full-time until they judge it optimal to leave,
and after leaving, they do not return. Empirically, in the OECD as a whole, only 6.4% of
those aged 25-29 years are still in education (full or part-time), while in the UK, over 90%
of college students have come directly from school.2
Using our model, we show that risk interacts with the education decision in some unex-
pected ways. Firstly, higher risk encourages individuals to accumulate more human capital
whereas we might have expected risk aversion to lead to less investment in a more risky
asset. As we show below, this result stems from the option structure of the problem and
does not depend on the degree of risk aversion. Individuals can avoid bad draws by stay-
ing in school but can leave to take advantage of the good draws. Thus higher uncertainty
increases the upside payoﬀ by more than the downside, making education more attractive.
We use our model to analyse the eﬀects of tax and education policy. Speciﬁcally, we
simulate the response of individuals to a variety of policy measures (fee reductions, tax
1The application of option theory to various economic problems has been analysed in Malliaris and Brock
(1982), Kamien and Schwartz (1991) and Dixit (1993). For speciﬁce x a m p l e sf r o mﬁnancial investment see
Merton (1971); for physical capital see Caballero and Engle (1999); for irreversible physical investment (so
called “real options”) see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
2See www.hesa.ac.uk and and Table E3.1 of OECD (2001) a summary of which is available from
www.oecd.org
2increases, reduction in progressivity of the tax system etc.). We build upon a large literature
including Trostel (1993) and Heckman et al. (1998) who examine the eﬀects of tax policy in
dynamic general equilibrium models under certainty; Eaton and Rosen (1980) and Altonji
(1993) who examine policy eﬀects in stochastic two period models; Keane and Wolpin (1997)
who estimated an empirical dynamic model of education choice and Williams (1979) who
adapted the portfolio choice model of Merton (1971) to allow for investment in human
capital.
As in Keane and Wolpin (1997) we show that a tuition subsidy could increase graduation
rates. In contrast to Trostel (1993) and in line with Eaton and Rosen (1980), we ﬁnd that
proportional tax increases can actually increase education attainment. We also show that
increases in progressivity can reduce the education attainment.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the problem, clariﬁes
exactly how we model stochastic returns and solves a model of education choice with uncer-
tain returns. Section 3 considers the policy implications of the model. Section 4 discusses
some extensions and section 5 concludes.
2 Education Choice
We start with a model of education choice similar to Card (2001) with the exception that
we allow for stochastic returns to education. An individual chooses the number of years
schooling (S) in order to maximise his or her expected discounted life time utility (1) subject















ct =¯ ct < S (2)
Assuming that the minimum school leaving age is normalised to t =0 , lifetime utility
is provided by consumption (c) throughout life (i.e. both during and after school) via
u, the instantaneous utility function and also by the direct (dis)utility of education, φ,
where u is an increasing concave function and ρ is the constant rate of time preference.
In order to focus on risk and the education decision, we abstract from the intertemporal
consumption decision by assuming that that ct =¯ c ∀ t<Swhere ¯ c is the level of
consumption (net of fees) before graduation. After graduation the individual consumes the
annuity value of permanent income. Another interpretation of this budget constraint is
that the agent is allowed smooth consumption in pre-graduation period and, separately, in
3the post graduation period. But she is restricted from smoothing across these two periods
i.e. expected future income from education cannot be used subsidize living standards in
education.3
Education choice is an optimal stopping problem, because the individual faces a once and
for all decision to leave school (i.e. choose S) and he or she cannot return at a later date.4
Implicitly we are assuming that there are psychic and ﬁnancial ﬁxed costs of returning to
education that are suﬃciently large to prevent return for all practical values of the other
parameters of the model. As we discuss in section 4, relaxing this assumption (so that an
individual can return at some ﬁnite cost) does not change our fundamental results. Note also
that as the problem is literally an option problem, it is best suited to analysing education
choice after the end of compulsory education. To this end, we interpret S as being the time
spent in post-compulsory education and ignore the case of those who leave school early in
violation of the law.
2.1 Risky Education
We can think of Y (S) as the starting wage after leaving education with S years completed
(or as the shadow wage of staying in education beyond S). The actual wage may grow after
graduation as experience and seniority are accumulated. We identify education with time
spent in school and college and not necessarily with the accumulation of formal credentials.
Of course the two are closely related, but there is empirical evidence of so-called “sheep-
skin” eﬀects i.e. non-linearities in earnings associated with school and college completion
dates.5 Allowing for these eﬀects would complicate the analysis without shedding much
light on the role of risk.
Consider staying on in school for κ more periods. The return to this extra schooling,
r(κ),w i l le q u a l
r(κ) ≡
Y (S + κ) − Y (S)
Y (S)
v N(gκ,κσ2)
which we assume is distributed as a normal random variable with mean g and standard
deviation σ when κ =1 . Thus, in this context, risk means that two otherwise identical
individuals may end up with diﬀerent lifetime income proﬁles, just because of a diﬀerent
3For an example relaxing this constraint, see Hogan and Walker (2002).
4This is a close approximation to reality — at least for formal schooling and initial college education.
Most individuals stay in education full-time until they judge it optimal to leave, and after leaving, they do
not return. The alternative, treating education as occurring continuously and at the same time as work is
better suited to the study of on the job training (see Williams, 1979).
5See Denny and Harmon (2001). Altonji (1993) presents a three period model of college attendance with
stochastic returns (via uncertain graduation) and sheepskin eﬀects.
4draw from the distribution of returns to education. By taking limits, we can show that, in
continuous time, the return to a inﬁnitesimally small extra period in school (r ≡ dY/Y)




= gdS + σdz (3)
where dz represents the increments of a standard Weiner process i.e. where each increment
is drawn from N(0,dS). Note that in the absence of uncertainty (σ2 =0 )the shadow wage
process (3) reduces to Y (S)=e x p ( gS). Thus (3) is essentially a continuous time stochastic
version of the standard Mincer (1974) earnings equation. Following our interpretation of S
as post-compulsory schooling, we interpret Y (0) as being the income proﬁle of an individual
with only the minimum education required by law and not as income of those with absolutely
no education.
Equation (3) states that for each instant that the individual remains in school her
shadow wage trends up at rate g. In addition, at each instant, the shadow wage is subject
to a (proportionate) shock that has zero mean and variance equal to σ2. Therefore even if
individuals start with the same (deterministic) Y (0) they will end up with diﬀerent Y (S).6
We can generalise (3) slightly by modeling the expected return to education as linear
function of Y as in (4). In the case of the Brownian motion, g1 =0whereas if g1 > 0
then (4) is to an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. We will use this process below to model
diminishing expected returns to education.7
dY
Y
=( g0 − g1Y )ds + σdz (4)
Note an implications of the speciﬁcation (4). The increments of the shadow wage are
normally distributed with both the mean and variance growing linearly with schooling i.e.
var(r)=σ2dS 6=( σdS)
2.8 The empirical evidence for this is mixed. Simple tabulations of
data from the U.K. Labour Force Survey (available on request) show the variance of earnings
rising with school in an approximately linear manner. The speciﬁcation is also consistent
with empirical results of Harmon et al. (2003). Furthermore, Carneiro et al. (2003b)
estimated a model controlling for selection in to education, to show that the variance of
6We treat Y (0) as being deterministic as it will be known to the agent by the time she comes to make
her education decision.
7Note that we have speciﬁed the return to education to be a diminishing function of the shadow wage
and not a of elapsed schooling time. We do this for analytical convenience so as to avoid getting a partial
deferential equation with time as a state variable.
8Judd (1998) models education risk explicitly as an implication of moral hazard. In his formulation, risk
acts like a ﬁxed cost of entry to the initial level of education and does not impact on the marginal eﬀect of
education above that level i.e. in our notation r ∼ N(gdS,σ
2)
5college earnings was higher than the variance of high school earnings. In contrast Belzil and
Hansen (2002) found the opposite and Chen (2003) found no diﬀerence between the two.
2.2 Solving The Model
In this section, we solve the model where education returns are given by the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process (4). The solution for the Brownian Motion (3) can be derived as a
special case of the general result when g1 =0 . We assume that utility is CRRA (i.e.
u(ct)=c1−γ/(1 −γ)). In principle φ could be negative if education is intrinsically disliked.
However, as education returns could be constant, we will assume that φ is constant through
time and positive, in order to avoid the corner solution (leave school immediately). Similarly
we also assume that ρ >g 0 (otherwise the agent would never leave school in absence of
diminishing returns). Finally, we assume that individuals are inﬁnitely lived (T = ∞) so
that time is not a state variable.
The intuition of the option approach is straight-forward. At any point in time, while the
individual is still in school, she has the option of leaving school. This option itself has value.
If she exercises this option she will loose the value of the option (because he cannot return
to school in the future) and will receive a life time income that is a function of accumulated
schooling. If she chooses not to exercise the option, she will receive whatever in-school
income/utility she has and will wait until next period when she will have the chance to
exercise the option again. By this time the value of the option will have changed in a
manner related to the underlying process for the shadow wage given by (4). The resulting
capital gain or loss is uncertain when viewed from the previous period. So exercising (or
not) the option involves taking a gamble.
More formally, Vt in (1) can be thought of as the value of the option to leave school
and start earning income at time t. Assuming that we don’t exercise the option (i.e. for
t ∈ [0..S]) then we can write equation (5) to describe how V will change over time.
ρVtdt =( u(¯ c)+φ)dt + E{dVt} (5)
This Bellman equation (5) can best be understood as an arbitrage equation.9 The right
hand side is the return from staying in school (i.e. holding the option) for length of time
dt. It consists of the dividend received over the period (which in our case is the constant
utility derived from education) and the expected capital gain or loss in the value of the
option over the period. Along the optimal path, this return must be equal to the return
9We can also derive (5) from (1) rigorously using Bellman’s Principle of Optimality (see Kamien and
Schwartz, 1991, pp. 259-262 , for details).
6from the alternative investment strategy of selling the asset and investing the proceeds at
the discount rate.
The optimal time in school (S∗) will be a stochastic variable, so it is easier to express
the control variable in terms of the level of the shadow wage at which it will be optimal to
leave school. This variable, which we denote Y ∗ will be deterministic. Because Y follows an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, so does V and using Ito’s lemma we can write the stochastic
diﬀerential for V as
dV (Y )=
½





dt + {σVY Y }dz
Note that E [dV ] contains a term in the variance of Y . This has important implications for
the eﬀect of risk on decisions. On average shocks have no eﬀect on Y i.e. E [dY]=Yg.
However if VYY > 0 they will have a positive eﬀect on the change in the value of the option
because the eﬀect of a negative shock will be smaller in absolute terms than will the eﬀect
of positive shocks. The results is that V will trend up (down) over time due to repeated
shocks to Y ,i fVYY is positive (negative).
We can substitute dV into the Bellman equation, use the fact that E[dz]=0and divide
by dt to get




The equation is a second order non-homogenous ordinary diﬀerential equation. It has a
free boundary given by Y ∗, the threshold level of the shadow wage at which the agent will
choose to leave school. We can verify by substitution that the general solution will be
V (Y )=B1Y θ1H(Y,θ1)+B2Y θ2H(Y,θ2)+φ/ρ + u(¯ c)/ρ (7)




σ2θ2 +( g0 −
1
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σ2)θ − ρ (8)
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b ≡ 2θ +
2g0
σ2
Economic theory provides three conditions (10) that determine the two constants of






V (Y ∗)=Ω(Y ∗) (10)
VY (Y ∗)=ΩY (Y ∗)
The ﬁrst states that as the shadow wage tends to zero the individual will never leave
education and so the value of being in school will simply equal the present value of the
direct utility of perpetual education (φ/p).11 This implies that the negative root, θ2, should
have no inﬂuence on V, as Y tends to zero. If it did then the value of the option to leave
school would tend to inﬁnity. The only way of ensuring this is if B2 =0 .
The second part of (10) is the “value matching” condition. When income reaches a
certain threshold level (Y ∗) the option is exercised, the individual leaves school and receives
that income for life. The present value of the utility generated by this perpetual income
stream is denoted by Ω(Y ∗).T h u sa tt i m et = S, when the option is about to be exercised,
its value will equal Ω(Y ∗)
The third condition, the “smooth pasting” condition, states that for the threshold level
of income to be chosen optimally, the net gain to any small changes in Y ∗ must have only
second order eﬀects. If we stay in school now while the market wage is Y ,t h e nw ec a n
leave school sometime in the future and earn (possibly) an even higher wage. The value
of this option to leave, when the current shadow wage is Y, is given by V (Y ).W h e n w e
leave school we gain Ω(Y ∗) but loose V (Y ). The net gain from leaving school when the
(shadow) wage is Y is therefore Ω(Y ∗) − V (Y ), so the optimal choice of Y ∗ implies the
10See Dixit and Pindyk (1994) page 163 and the references cited therein. Note that H reduces to the
exponential function when b = θ and reduces to H =1when g1 =0
11Without loss of generality we normalise utility such that u(¯ c)=0or equivalently interpret φ to be
the utility of being in education comprised of the intrinsic psychic value of education and the utility of
consumption less education fees.
8smooth pasting condition.12
When the individual exercises her option and leaves school she will receive a certain
salary which will generate a certain lifetime utility, Ω (i.e. the second integral in (1)). The
exact value of of post school life-time utility, Ω(Y ), depends on how wages evolve after
leaving school. If the individual smooths consumption after graduation, we can calculate
Ω(Y ) by direct integration to get the familiar solution (11) where α is the growth of income
after graduation (i.e. the “experience” term in the Mincer equation) and where we assume













Thus the optimal shadow wage Y ∗ is implicitly deﬁned by the following equations
B1Y θH(Y,θ)+φ/ρ = Ω(Y )
(12)
B1θY θ−1H(Y,θ)+B1Y θHY (Y,θ)=ΩY (Y )
where θ is the positive root of (8); Ω is deﬁn e db y( 1 1 ) ;H i sg i v e nb y( 2 )a n ds u b s c r i p t s
denote the partial derivative.
In general there is no closed form solution to (12). However when expected returns
to education are constant, the shadow wage follows a Brownian motion (i.e. g1 =0 )a n d
H =1 . In this case we can generate a closed form solution which we state as Proposition
1b e l o w .
Proposition 1 When (i) returns to education are normally distributed with mean g0 and
variance σ2; (ii) preferences are u(c)=c1−γ/(1−γ), the threshold level of the shadow wage






θ − (1 − γ)
¸ 1
1−γ
where θ is the positive root of Q in (8), ρ i st h ed i s c o u n tr a t ea n dφ is intrinsic utility of
education. Furthermore we have ∂Y ∗
∂g0 > 0, ∂Y ∗
∂ρ < 0, ∂Y ∗
∂σ > 0, ∂Y ∗
∂φ > 0.
12This justiﬁcation of the smooth pasting condition is intuitive but simplistic. A more complete treatment
can be found in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
13Heckman et al. (2001) have cast doubt on the empirical relevance of this time separability assumption,
providing evidence that in the US at least, earnings growth after leaving school is a function of the education
level. But we continue to assume it here for analytical convenience.
9Proof. The expression for Y ∗ follows directly from solving for Y ∗ from (12) given (11)
and (8). The derivatives follow by application of the implicit function theorem to (8) and
(2).
Suﬃcient conditions for Y ∗ > 0 are that φ > 0 and ρ >g .If the latter were not the case,
school would always provide a better return (on average) and it would be optimal to stay
in school for ever. As we would expect, Y ∗ is an increasing function of g and a decreasing
function of ρ. Thus high returns to education will cause individuals to stay in school longer
whereas a high discount rate will induce them to leave earlier.
The threshold level of the shadow wage (Y ∗) is also an increasing function of risk, so
the threshold is higher than under certainty, which we can verify by direct integration of (1)
when returns are certain. We can also show that Y ∗ becomes inﬁnite as σ2 →∞ ,i m p l y i n g
that the agent will never leave school.
The fact that risk increases the amount of schooling is, perhaps, surprising. Using the
investment analogy, one might have expected less investment in human capital as the risk
associated with that investment rose. Our result is due to the fact that leaving school is an
irreversible decision. Risk creates a value to waiting because if we stay in school we have the
option to leave next period in order to take advantage of a good draw from the distribution of
returns or to remain in education so as to avoid a bad draw. Uncertainty has an asymmetric
eﬀect, increasing the potential upside payoﬀ from the option, but, because we will stay in
school if the market wage turns out to be low, the downside payoﬀ is unchanged. This eﬀect
becomes stronger as the riskiness of education increases. Indeed when risk becomes inﬁnite,
the agent will never want to exercise the option to leave.
This result is in line with what we would expect from ﬁnancial option theory. Increased
risk in the underlying security tends to increase the value of the option because increased
variability implies that the option is more likely to be “in the money” at some point in the
future.
Note also that risk has an eﬀect on the education decision even if the agent is apparently
risk neutral i.e. if γ =0then Y ∗ is still a function of σ via θ. In fact the risk aversion does
not aﬀect sign of any of the derivatives in Proposition 1; γ just acts as a scaling factor.
Again the reason is that risk in the presence of an irreversibility creates a value to waiting
– even for the risk neutral investor. Another way of seeing this is to note that while
instantaneous utility is linear, lifetime utility, V ,h a sVYY > 0. In fact, it is easy to show
that the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for lifetime utility is negative for any g1 ≥ 0.I t
is as if the irreversibility has changed a risk neutral agent into a risk lover.
All this is intuitive, but note that it has the implication that the individual will accu-
mulate more human capital when the risk associated with that investment is higher. This
10prediction contrasts with that of the portfolio model of Williams (1979). In his model, an
increase in the risk of human capital (or any other asset), would cause the individual to
accumulate less of it, other things being equal. The reason for this diﬀerence is the nature
of the choice facing the agent. His approach treats education as occurring continuously
and at the same time as work. There is no irreversibility, the agent can come in and out
of education as she pleases for zero cost (other than forgone wages). Because there is no
irreversibility there is no value to waiting.
Figure 1 illustrates the solution of the model for the simple case where γ = α = g1 =0 .
The graph shows the function V (Y ), the value of the option to wait and the function
Ω(Y )=Y/ρ, the value of leaving education when the market wage is Y .A t t h e o p t i m a l
point, V and Ω are equal and meet as tangents. For shadow wages less than the optimal
(Y< Y ∗), the value of the option to wait (V ) is greater than the life-time utility from
leaving now (Ω), so the individual remains in education. When the shadow wage is zero,
the optimal decision would be to say in school for ever, generating a life-time utility of φ/ρ.
As the shadow wage increases, Ω, the gain from leaving also increases. But so does the cost
o fl e a v i n gi . e .t h ev a l u eo ft h eo p t i o nt ol e a v ea ts o m ep o i n ti nt h ef u t u r e .A tt h eo p t i m a l
threshold the two are equal. Note it may appear from the diagram that it is optimal to
remain in school if Y> Y ∗. This is not true. Because of the value matching condition, the
v a l u eo fl i f e t i m ei n c o m ei sg i v e nb yΩ(Y ) when Y> Y ∗, so that the full function V is given
by [abd]. The line segment [bc] is irrelevant.
2.3 Numerical Simulation
Proposition 1 applied only in the case of constant expected returns to education. When we
allow for diminishing returns, the model (12) requires a numerical solution. In this section
we present numerical simulations of the model to illustrate the eﬀects of changes in various
parameters. Table 1 presents the baseline values of the parameters used in the simulation.
All are plausible, if conservative, values. For simplicity we simulate the model assuming
γ =1i.e. log utility. We assume that the expected rate of return on education (g0) is
7% per annum which is in line with OLS estimates but less than most IV estimates (see
Card, 2001). The estimate of risk (σ) at 2% seems reasonable given our choice of g. It is
also in line with estimates provided by Harmon et al. (2003) and Conneely and Uusitalo
(1999) but more than estimated by Carneiro et al. (2003b) and less than estimated by Chen
(2003). Unless otherwise indicated we will assume that g1 =0so that expected returns are
constant. The discount rate (ρ) is equal to 10%.
Together Y (0) and φ act as numeraires for the problem. The parameter Y (0) can be
thought of as representing the income received by an individual who leaves school immedi-
11ately after the end of compulsory education. Without loss of generality, Y (0) is set equal
to unity so that Y is expressed in terms of a multiple of the wage associated with mini-
mum education. We set the intrinsic utility of school so as to ensure that, in the absence
of uncertainty, an individual would optimally choose to leave after exactly 2 years of post
compulsory schooling. Given these baseline parameters, Y ∗ =1 .15 implying an expectation
of just over two years of post compulsory schooling.
Proposition 1 states that the eﬀect of increases in the expected rate of return to education
is unambiguously positive for the constant returns case (g1 =0 ) . Figure 2 illustrates the
point numerically for various values of g0 and g1. Unless the diminishing returns parameter
is extremely large, higher expected returns induce the individual to stay in education longer.
The eﬀect of risk on education is also positive for essentially the same reason as before: an
irreversible decision in the presence of risk creates an incentive to wait. Figure 3 illustrates
this eﬀect numerically. The eﬀect is positive, but is much smaller than the eﬀect of expected
returns. The interaction between the three parameters σ,g 0 and g1 is illustrated in table 2.
Because the evolution of income is stochastic, there is no expression for S as there
would be in the certainty case. When returns are stochastic, S∗ will be a random variable
and the best we can do is to describe its distribution. We describe it numerically for the
constant returns case.14 Figure 4 and Table 3 present the results of this simulation for
various diﬀerent levels of risk. As can be seen, increasing risk leads to an increase in E(S∗).
This is to be expected given that Y ∗, the target level of the shadow wage will have increased
(more easily seen in Table 3). It is also clear that the variance of S∗ will rise. Again this
is intuitive: as the process for the shadow wage gets more uncertain, the time it takes for
that process to reach any given level becomes more uncertain. What is more surprising is
that the distribution of S∗ becomes increasingly skewed at higher levels of risk. The reason
is that direct eﬀect of higher risk on the mean and variance of S∗ makes higher values of
S∗ relatively more likely than lower values. This coupled with the fact that S∗ is bounded
at zero results in a skewed distribution.
3 Policy Implications
In the section we use the model to examine the impact on individuals’ education decisions
of some simple stylised government policies. We can model the direct eﬀect of an education
14If the individual starts with income Y0 how long will it take for income to reach the threshold value
(Y
∗) when it evolves according to (3)? The probability that an individual will still be in school at time t
(so that S
∗ greater than t) is equal to the probability that the income process will not have reached the
trigger level at time t (so Yt <Y
∗). This implies that P(S
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and Φ is the c.d.f. of a standard normal random variable.
12subsidy as an increase in φ. We already know from Proposition 1 that the eﬀect of an
increase in φ is to increase the threshold shadow wages, and thus lead to an increase in
schooling.
If the subsidy is ﬁnanced from general taxation, then there will be no other eﬀects on
the individuals education choice. Many real world tuition ﬁnance programmes, however,
require the student to pay back some of the tuition after graduation. For reasons of public
policy, the government, unlike a private lender, is willing to overlook the moral hazard
problem. Indeed by making re-payment conditional on graduation or some means test, the
government is implicitly acknowledging that the option structure of individual education
choice and even encouraging moral hazard behaviour.
We can think of three broad types of tuition payment plans. Firstly, tuition could be
paid back in ﬁxed installments as with a standard loan repayment. In the context of our
model, this would be equivalent to levying a lump-sum tax on earnings after graduation.
Alternatively, the repayments could be ﬁxed as proportion of earnings. This is the equivalent
of a proportional tax on labour income. Alternatively, a tuition payment plan could combine
proportionate and lump sum elements equivalent to a progressive (or even regressive) wage
income tax.
It turns out that we can easily accommodate the three diﬀerent taxes in the model. The
state variable is still Y , but now we interpret it now as being the (shadow) wage gross of
taxes/repayments. We deﬁne a new variable ω = f(Y ) which is the net wage received upon
graduation.
ω = f(Y )=Y − τY ε (13)
The function f(Y ) summarizes the relevant parameters of the tax system. The parameter
ε is equal to the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate. It represents the
extent to which the tax system is progressive or regressive. For lump-sum taxes ε =0
(i.e. perfectly regressive) and we interpret τ as the amount of the lump sum tax. For
proportional taxes, ε =1and we interpret τ as the proportionate tax rate. For regressive
taxes, ε ∈ [0,1), the marginal tax rate is less than the average tax rate for all income. For
a progressive tax system, ε > 1, marginal tax rates are higher than average tax rates for all
incomes.15
The variable ω directly eﬀects the problem only through Ω, the utility after graduation.
The structure of the option is unaﬀected as is the form of the function V which must
still solve the Bellman equation (6). The value matching and smooth pasting conditions
15Note for simplicity we assume that capital gains and net interest payments are not taxable income.
13will change to V (Y )=Ω(f(Y )) and VY (Y )=Ωω(f(Y )) ∗ fY (Y ) respectively.16 This
modiﬁcation to the model allows us to state Proposition 2 for the case of constant returns.
Proposition 2 When (i) returns to education are normally distributed with mean g0 and
variance σ2; (ii) preferences are u(c)=c1−γ/(1−γ), the imposition of either a lump sum or
a proportional tax will lead to an increase in Y ∗. An increase in the degree of progressivity
of the tax system could lead to an increase or decrease in Y ∗ depending on the degree of risk
aversion and the degree of progressivity.
Proof. See Appendix
At ﬁrst glance this may seem a curious result. The tax reduces the beneﬁto fs c h o o l i n g ,
so that the value of the option to wait falls. But the value of leaving school, Ω,f a l l sb y
more. The net result is that school becomes relatively more attractive, and the individual
stays for longer. Figure 5 illustrates this for the case of the simple model of proposition
1w i t hα =0 ,g 1 =0and γ =1(log utility). Following the imposition of a tax, the
individual seeks to maintain living standards by boosting her gross wage. The only way
to to this is to stay in school longer. In essence, we have an income eﬀect without any
associated substitution eﬀect. There is no counteracting substitution eﬀect because both
a lump-sum and a proportionate tax will not change the risk and return associated with
continuing to the next level of education. In fact, it is straight forward to show that if
the tax revenue is returned to the individuals in a lump-sum, the income eﬀect will be
nulliﬁed, thus compensated changes in proportional taxes will have no eﬀect on education
attainment. This is a standard result in the literature (for example, see Heckman et al.,
1998).
T h es i t u a t i o nc a nb ed i ﬀerent when taxes are progressive (or regressive). In that case,
the after-tax risk and return to education will be diﬀerent for diﬀerent levels of education.
For example, a progressive tax will levy a higher proportional charge on higher incomes,
so that the risk and return associated with proceeding from a lower to a higher level of
education will both be reduced. This in turn, will reduce the value of the option to wait.
If large enough, this substitution eﬀect can overcome the income eﬀect and lead to fall in
education. As we show in the appendix, a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for this
to occur is that εlnY ∗ < 1. This condition illustrates how risk (via Y ∗) interacts with the
degree of progressivity of the tax system to determine the strength of the substitution eﬀect.
16Note that the actual value of the option will be aﬀected via the smooth pasting and value matching
conditions, leading to a diﬀerent value for the constant B1.
14When higher risk (lower Y ∗) is combined with higher progressivity, the condition will hold
and progressivity can have a negative (uncompensated) impact on education choice.
We illustrate this in Figure 6, where the baseline parameters are from Table 1. The
horizontal axis represents the parameter ε which goes from zero (representing a perfectly
regressive lump sum tax) through to unity (representing a proportional tax) and beyond
(representing progressive taxation). The fact that taxes (progressivity or otherwise) will
increase education attainment raises the interesting possibility that of policy of education
subsidy (i.e. higher φ) ﬁnanced by taxation of education returns after graduation will raise
education attainment both directly via the subsidy and indirectly via the tax. Thus a
self-ﬁnancing education loan or subsidy scheme would have a positive eﬀect on education.
Our results diﬀer with some of the rest of the literature, particularly Trostel (1993). He
calibrates a dynamic general equilibrium model of human capital accumulation (without
uncertainty) to show that a proportional (compensated) wage tax can have a negative
impact on human capital accumulation. This result is generated in part by the assumption
that labour supply is elastic. In this case, the imposition of the tax reduces labour supply,
and hence also reduces the eﬀective return to human capital. However, as Heckman (1993)
shows, there is now something of a consensus that the labour supply elasticity of men (on
intensive margin) is highly inelastic suggesting that the eﬀect identiﬁed by Trostel (1993)
is not empirically signiﬁcant.
Lin (1998) shows that in a non-stochastic OLG model, an uncompensated increase in
a (proportional) wage tax can reduce human capital accumulation. This result depends
crucially on a capital market channel that is absent in our model. An increase in wage
taxes can reduce savings, leading to a lower stock of physical capital. This in turn leads to
higher interest rates which makes investment in human capital less attractive at the margin.
T h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect disappears if tax revenue is redistributed to tax payers. In this case
their income and saving remain the same so interest rates remain unchanged.
Eaton and Rosen (1980) is one of the few papers to consider explicitly the eﬀect of
taxation in model of education choice with uncertainty.17 They show that in a two period
model, the imposition of a proportional (uncompensated) wage tax will have an ambiguous
eﬀect on education. However, when preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion and
initial wealth is suﬃciently high, they show that an uncompensated proportional wage tax
has a positive eﬀect on human capital accumulation. Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate
the parameters of an empirical dynamic model of education choice. They show that their
17In their model uncertainty is multiplicative in income, so the marginal product of human capital is
stochastic but the rate of return is deterministic i.e. Y (s)=λW(s) where λ is stochastic (mean one) and
W is deterministic.
15results imply that a tuition subsidy of $2,000 would increase school and college graduation
rates by 3.5 and 8.5 percentage points respectively.
4 Discussion and Extensions
The model we have presented was structured so that it would yield analytical solutions. In
this section we argue that the results of section 2 are quite robust and that most (but not
all) of the extensions that we might contemplate would not change the fundamental results
at the cost of considerable complication in the analysis.
The most obvious extension to the model would be to account for ﬁnite life and education
opportunities i.e. S ≤ T<∞. It turns out that it is very easy to accommodate this change.
If we do not insist on a deterministic length of life, we can allow death/retirement to arrive
according to a Poisson process with parameter λ. A si sw e l lk n o w n ,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
increasing the discount rate from ρ to ρ+λ and keeping T = ∞. So the qualitative results
will be exactly the same.
For a deterministic death/retirement date, time becomes the third state variable of
the problem. A term involving Vt will appear in the Bellman equation (6) and the value
matching and smooth pasting conditions will be V (Y,t)=Ω(Y,t) and VY (Y,t)=ΩY (Y,t)
respectively. This free boundary problem will have to be solved numerically as there will be
no closed form solutions for V or Ω. However, the basic results of Proposition 1 will not be
aﬀected as the structure of the problem is unchanged. There is a still an option. Its value
still increases in uncertainty. It is this value of waiting that drives all the main results of
the model. All that has changed is that the option now has a ﬁnite expiry date. In fact the
problem is now very close to the Black-Scholes analysis of a ﬁnancial call option.
Another extension is to include post schooling risk i.e. that the income process after
graduation should be stochastic. Again, the overall structure of the option problem would
not change. With irreversibility, there would still be a value to waiting due to the uncertainty
regarding the shadow wage (i.e. uncertainty before graduation). The value matching and
smooth pasting conditions that determine the value of the option would still be deﬁned in
terms of the same function V . The introduction of uncertainty post graduation leaves the
structure of the problem unchanged. The only diﬀerence would be that the function Ω(Y )
would not have an analytical representation and its value would be aﬀected (negatively) by
the variance of the wage process after graduation. This case has been analysed in detail by
Hartog et al. (2004).
A more fundamental change would be to allow σ to vary with S. Our model assumed
that the variance of the distribution of the returns to education was the same for all levels of
16education (so that the variance of the shadow wage rose linearly with education). This makes
the problem tractable and, given the relative paucity of information on this issue, seems
reasonable. But it is at least possible that risk could increase or decrease with education. If
further education decreased risk, we might expect individuals to choose further education
as a form of insurance. However, to be set against this is the fact that lower risk would
decrease the value of the option to stay in school suggesting that it would be optimal to leave
earlier. Analysing how these two eﬀects interact would make for a interesting extension to
our model.
Another useful extension could be made by explicitly considering “sheep-skin” eﬀects
i.e. the possibility that the mean and variance of education returns may be function not
of time in school, but of qualiﬁcations attained. This change would generate a diﬀerent
stochastic process for the shadow wage. However, the option to leave school would still
have value (one that was increasing in risk) and so our basic qualitative results would still
hold.
Another obvious change that we could make is to relax the assumption that individuals
cannot return to education. We could allow individuals to return to education for some
ﬁnite cost. However, to the extent that return was not completely costless, there would still
be some partial irreversibility. Our basic results would continue to hold for the same reason
as before — irreversibility in the presence of uncertainty creates a value to waiting (albeit
lower than the case of complete irreversibility). It is this value that generates our results.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we apply the techniques of option theory to the study the education decisions of
individuals when the returns to education are uncertain. We view an individual in school as
possessing an option to leave at any time and take up work at a wage related (stochastically)
to the time spent in school. Once that option is exercised, the individual cannot return to
school.
We show that high returns to education will cause individuals to stay in school longer
whereas a high discount rate will induce them to leave earlier. Furthermore we also show
that increasing risk will cause an individual to delay leaving school. This result is not
dependent on the risk preferences of agents as it holds for risk neutral agents also. On
the face of it, this is curious result, we would expect that higher risk would lead to less
investment in human capital. The result stems from treating education as an option. Higher
uncertainty, therefore provides an incentive to delay leaving so as to see if uncertainty may
resolve itself favorably.
17In contrast to many models of human capital accumulation, we show that increased
labour income taxation would induce individuals to stay in school longer. An exception
could occurr when high levels of progressivity are combined with high levels of risk. In this
case further increases in progressivity may cause eduaction attainment to fall. Finally we
argued that changes in the speciﬁcation of the model (time limits, costly return to school
etc.) would not aﬀect the nature of the results as long as the basic option structure remained
the same.
18A Proof of Proposition 2
We can prove Proposition 2 for the case of constant expected returns to education (g1 =0 ) .
We extend the model to account for taxes, by specifying ω to be net income and ε to be
parameter that models the progressivity of the tax system, as in (13). The function f(Y )
summarizes the three types of taxes. In general ε equals the ratio of marginal to average
tax rates. For lump-sum taxes ε =0and we interpret τ as the amount of the lump sum
tax. For proportional taxes, ε =1and we interpret τ as the proportionate tax rate. For a
progressive tax system we have ε > 1. Again we can only prove the proposition analytically
for constant expected returns (g1 =0 ) .
We make use of the matrix version of the implicit function theorem. Re-write the (12)
system of implicit equations that jointly determine Y ∗ and the constant of integration B1
as (14) below.
G1 = Ωω(f(Y ∗))fY (Y ) − VY (Y ∗)=0
(14)
G2 = Ω(f(Y ∗)) − V (Y ∗)=0
For constant returns to education H ≡ 1, therefore we have:
VB1 = Y θ1 > 0 ΩB1 =0
VYB 1 = θ1Y θ1−1 > 0 ΩYB 1 =0
Vφ > 0 VY φ =0
VY θ = B1Y θ−1(lnθ +1 )
Vθ = B1Y θ lnθ VYY = B1θ(θ − 1)Y θ−2 > 0
(15)
We can sign some more derivatives on the assumption that preferences are CRRA and
γ ≥ 0. Note that these derivatives would probably hold for any “well behaved” preferences
i.e. ucc/uc < 0.
Ωωω ≤ 0
Furthermore fYY ≤ 0 for ε =0and ε ≥ 1. Thus
ΩY = ΩωfY > 0
ΩYY = ΩωωfY fY + ΩωfYY ≤ 0
The Jacobian of the system (14) is given by J. Its determinant, |J| 6=0 , so the implicit
function theorem applies.
19|J| = −VB1 [ΩxxfY fY + fYYΩx − VYY] > 0
Thus |J| > 0 and the distinction between net and gross income will not aﬀect the sign of any
of the derivatives in Proposition 1 when taxes are lump sum, proportional or progressive.
Only in the case of a particular choice of parameters and for some particular values of ε
that must be between zero and one, will the derivatives change sign.












where all derivatives are evaluated in the neighbourhood of the optimum. Using the implicit
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In order to prove Proposition 2 we calculate
|Jτ| =+ VB1fτfY Ωxx − VYB 1Ωxfτ > 0
|Jε| =+ VB1 [fεfY Ωxx + fY εΩx] − VYB 1fεΩx







where τ can be interpreted as either a lump-sum or proportional tax rate, depending on ε.
For progressive taxes, the eﬀect of changes in the degree of progressivity are more







All the terms in |Jε| are can be signed unambiguously with the exception of fY ε.I ffY ε > 0
then |Jε| > 0,s oas u ﬃcient condition for ∂Y ∗
∂ε > 0 is that εlnY ∗ < 1. Note that there is
no simple condition suﬃcient to ensure that |Jε| < 0.
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24Table 1: Baseline Parameters for Simulation
Parameter Deﬁnition Value
γ CRRA 1.0
Y0 Wage with min. Schooling 1.0
ρ Discount rate 0.1
φ Intrinsic utility from Education 1.742
g0 Mean Return to Education 0.07
g1 Diminishing return 0.00
α Growth of Y after graduation 0.00
σ Stn. Dev. of Return to Education 0.02
25Table 2: Threshold Income with Diminishing Returns to Education
g0 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.15
g1 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
Risk (σ)
0.00
0.02 1.1509 1.0384 1.7899
0.04 1.1539 1.0429 1.7914
0.06 1.1587 1.0504 1.7935
0.08 1.1650 1.0600 1.7965
0.10 1.1725 1.0714 1.7998
0.12 1.1815 1.0843 1.8034
0.14 1.1914 1.0981 1.8070
0.16 1.2016 1.1128 1.8100
0.18 1.2127 1.1275 1.8130
0.20 1.2241 1.1425 1.8154
1. Simulation of basic model as in equation (12)
2. Key parameters: as table 1
Table 3: Optimal School Leaving
Education Threshold Time in School (S∗)
Risk Income
σ Y ∗ E(S∗) Stn(S∗) Skew
0 1.1500 2.0 - -
0.02 1.1509 2.01 0.42 0.60
0.04 1.1539 2.07 0.92 1.15
0.06 1.1587 2.16 1.44 1.15
0.08 1.1650 2.28 1.76 0.96
0.10 1.1725 2.44 1.93 0.86
0.12 1.1815 2.65 2.03 0.83
0.14 1.1914 2.90 2.08 0.86
0.16 1.2016 3.21 2.10 0.90
0.18 1.2127 3.58 2.09 0.98
1. Based on 10,0000 draws from distribution of S∗
2. Key parameters as in table 1
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